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CONNELL: ANTITRUST LAW AT THE EXPENSE OF
LABOR LAW
Theodore J. St. Antoine *
A

PERSONAL NOTE

T

O lose a man of Bernie Dunau's talents and accomplishments
is always saddening. To lose him when he still had so much
left to do, so much left to say, is truly tragic. I wish we could have
heard him on Connell Construction' Co. v. Plumbers Local 100,1
the Supreme Court's latest attempt to grapple with the old, intractable problem of reconciling union restrictive practices and the
strictures of the antitrust laws. Bernie was a craftsman in the
noblest sense of the word; and doughty advocate though he could
be, he was also a person who would not let partisanship keep him
from forming a detached opinion on a legal issue. Connell, to say
it straightaway, is an example neither of sound craftsmanship nor
of balanced judgment. Bernie would have descended upon it with
gusto, and dismantled it piece by piece.
When Bernie and I were in harness together, some dozen years
ago, he invariably lightened my load by producing an exhaustive
100-page principal brief that dealt thoroughly and artfully with
every issue in the case. This left me free to glide in with a slender
amicus presentation and merely highlight such matters as seemed
to me of greatest moment. I hope it will not be thought amiss if,
in this tribute to Bernie, I assume my accustomed role in our
former collaboration. My aim will be to set in. bold relief the outlines of antitrust law as it relates to the labor field, not to provide
the comprehensive, meticulously detailed study Bernie would have
given us. I can pay his memory no higher honor than to say I shall
write easier, knowing I am not trying to step into his place.
and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
2 I like to think that my intervening years in the academic world have expunged any
taint of client interest. But for the record I should note that two of the cases on which
Mr. Dunau and I worked were the companion antitrust decisions in UMW v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965), and Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). He
briefed and argued the latter for the union, and I briefed and argued the former for the
AFL-CIO as amicus curiae.
*Dean

1 421 U.S. 616 (1975),
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EARLY APPLICATIONS OF ANTITRUST TO LABOR

From the outset, the difficulty in applying the antitrust concept
to organized labor has been that the two are intrinsically incompatible. The antitrust laws are designed to promote competition,
and unions, avowedly and unabashedly, are designed to limit it.
According to classical trade union theory, the objective is the
elimination of wage competition among all employees doing the
same job in the same industry.3 Logically extended, the policy
against restraint of trade must condemn the very existence of labor
organizations, since their minimum aim has always been the suppression of any inclination on the part of working people to offer
their services to employers at different prices. Indeed, the initial
reaction of the common law was to brand the concerted activities
of labor unions, even those we today would term primary strikes,
as criminal conspiracies.4 If labor organizations were to be legitimated despite our usual policies favoring wide-open competition,
it would have to be on the basis of other, quite different societal
values. By the time the Sherman Antitrust Act 5 was passed in 1890,
the courts had come to recognize the existence of those other, collective values, and had generally accepted the legality of peaceful
strikes by employees against their employer for such purposes as
6
higher wages and shorter hours.
The Sherman Act was intended to deal primarily with business
monopolies and trade restraints, and there is a very real question
whether Congress meant it to apply to labor combinations at all.7
In Loewe v. Lawlor, the famous and badly argued Danbury Hatters case," the Supreme Court held that labor unions were not
3 See, e.g., S. & B. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 173-79 (1920).

4 E.g., Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case [Commonwealth v. Pullis] (Philadelphia Mayor's
Ct. 1806), reported in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDSTRIAL SoCIETY 59

(J.

Commons & E. Gilmore eds. 1910).
5 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
6 E.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346 (1842).
7 See, e.g., E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACr 3-54 (1930); A. MASON, OR(1925) ; Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes
(pts. 1-2), 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1283 (1939), 40 COLUM. L. REV. 14 (1940); Emery, Labor

GANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW 120-31

Organizationsand the Sherman Law, 20 J. POL. ECON. 599 (1912).
8 208 U.S. 274 (1908). The Hatters Union and the AFL instituted a nationwide boycott of nonunion hats. The unions defended on the ground the restraints were local in
nature, and did not affect interstate commerce. No serious effort was made to argue that
the restrictions imposed were not of the kind covered by the Sherman Act. See E. BERMAN,
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automatically excluded from the ambit of antitrust regulation.
Thereafter, the Court had to embark on the task of deciding which
union activities were restraints of trade, and which were not. Undoubtedly influenced by the later common law precedents and the
growing importance of unions in our society, the Court concluded
that labor's basic weapon, the primary strike, ordinarily constituted only an indirect restraint on competition, and thus was not an
antitrust violation. 9 But the boycott, in all its manifestations, was
something else. If a union persuaded its members and friends
throughout the country not to buy nonunion hats (a primary consumer boycott), or not to patronize merchants handling such hats
(a secondary consumer boycott), the union was guilty of a direct
restraint of trade.'0 The same finding of illegality followed if a
union persuaded employees in another state to refuse to transport,
install, or work on such nonunion products as printing presses 1
or cut stone 12 (classic secondary strikes or boycotts).
A curious paradox thus developed. If a strong union, through a
successful strike, totally cut off a supply of goods at its source, that
was lawful as nothing more than an indirect restraint on interstate
commerce. But if a weaker union failed to halt production and
had to turn to the more unwieldly boycott to inhibit the sale and
use of goods at their destination, that would be an unlawful direct
restraint. Perhaps the Supreme Court was trying to face up to this
anomaly in Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW,13 the second Coronado
case, when it pinpointed the union's subjective intent as the crucial
element in determining the existence of a Sherman Act violation.
Even a primary strike would be unlawful if it could be shown that
the union leadership in fact intended to keep a nonunion product
4
out of the interstate market.'
supra note 7, at 86: "An adequate presentation of the Hatters' case to the Supreme Court
might have greatly changed the history of labor cases since 1908."
9 UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
10 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
11 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). In 1914 Congress had
apparently sought to remove traditional trade union activity, such as picketing, from
the coverage of the antitrust laws, when carried on in the course of a labor dispute. Clay
ton Act §§ 6, 20, ch. 323, §§ 6, 20, 38 Stat. 731, 738 (1914) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 17, 29
U.S.C. § 52 (1970)). But the Supreme Court narrowly restricted this statutory exemption
to disputes between employers and their own immediate employees thus leaving "stranger"
picketing subject to antitrust bans. 254 U.S. at 471-76.
12 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
268 U.S. 295 (1925).
14 Id. at 310.
'3
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While the Court may have been headed toward a consistent
theory for assessing union activity under the Sherman Act-was
there an intent to suppress competition?-it was also treading on
highly dangerous ground as a practical matter. Surely it can be
argued that the primary strike, at least the primary organizational
strike, nearly always involves an intent to suppress competition by
eliminating the employer's product from the market until the
employer bows to the union's demands. The only difference in the
Court's treatment of the secondary boycott in these earlier cases
would appear to be that the Court was prepared to infer the forbidden anticompetitive purpose from the boycott itself, without
any proof of subjective intent.
At this juncture Justice Stone stepped in to rewrite the Supreme
Court's antitrust teachings. The actual holding in Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader '" was that a union did not violate the Sherman Act
by engaging in a violent primary sit-down strike. Much more important are the famous dicta that the Sherman Act, as written, was
aimed only at "some form of restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods or services," 16 and that it was not
directed at "an elimination of price competition based on differences in labor standards." 11 By my lights, Stone thus swept away
the underpinning of all the earlier boycott cases and the second
Coronado case as well, although he did not expressly acknowledge
this fact.
Stone was careful to say, however, that his test did not vary depending on the nature of the alleged wrongdoer, whether union or
management.' 8 The Apex Hosiery approach was not a matter of a
statutory union exemption; the Sherman Act, as written, would
simply not apply to a certain class of restraints. Employers, or employers in combination with unions, would presumably be as free
as unions acting alone to halt competition grounded in wage
differentials.' 9 In short, the Sherman Act would be confined to restraints on the product market, and the labor market would be
beyond its ken.
15 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
16 Id. at 495.
17 Id. at 503.
18 Id. at 512.
19 On the immunity of agreements among employers dealing with labor standards, see
Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
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Further refinement of the Apex Hosiery doctrine might have
been the soundest course for the Court to follow in dealing with
labor and the antitrust laws. But that was not to be. A year after
Apex Hosiery, Justice Frankfurter produced his great tour-de-force
in United States v. Hutcheson,20 and we had a whole new theory of
union antitrust immunity. Hutcheson started with a jurisdictional
dispute between two unions over a work assignment by AnheuserBusch. The union that did not get the assignment organized a
strike among the employees of certain contractors erecting a building for Anheuser-Busch, and organized a boycott of AnheuserBusch beer by union members and friends. Under lexisting precedent, this was a Sherman Act violation. But Justice Frankfurter
examined the anti-injunction provisions of the Clayton 2' and
Norris-La Guardia 22 Acts, and pronounced the startling conclusion that activity immunized against injunctive relief by those two
statutes, read together, was not to be deemed a substantive offense
under the Sherman Act. 23 The effect was to exempt from antitrust
regulation peaceful, nonfraudulent union conduct in the course of
a labor dispute, as long as a union acts in its own interest and does
not combine with nonlabor groups. Unlike Stone, who declared in
Apex Hosiery that the Sherman Act as such did not cover restraints
in the labor market whether imposed by labor or capital, Frankfurter created in Hutcheson a genuine exemption from the antitrust laws for unions "acting alone."
The corollary to this, as Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3 24
subsequently made clear, was that labor organizations lose their
immunity when they "aid nonlabor groups to create business
monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services. "25
In Allen Bradley the electrical manufacturers, the electrical contractors, and the electrical workers' union in New York City de20

312 U.S. 219 (1941). A perceptive and provocative analysis of Hutcheson is provided

by C. GREGORY,

LABOR AND THE LAiv

269-79 (2d rev. ed. 1958).

15 U.S.C. § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
22 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
23 312 U.S. at 232-36.
24 325 U.S. 797 (1945). Excellent analyses of the development of labor antitrust law
during this period include Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 252 (1955); Smith, Antitrust and Labor, 53 MicH. L. REv. 1119 (1955);
Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley, 13 LAB. L.J.
957 (1962) ; Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963).
25 325 U.S. at 808.
21
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vised a simple scheme for establishing a complete monopoly over
the electrical business in the city. The manufacturers agreed they
would make local sales only to union contractors, and the contractors agreed they would purchase and install only the products of
local union manufacturers. The effect could be described as a
secondary boycott squared. The combination, needless to say,
produced a bonanza for all hands: more sales, higher prices, and
better wages. At the suit brought by out-of-town manufacturers,
however, the Supreme Court declared the whole arrangement
violative of the Sherman Act, with the union guilty along with the
employers. As the Court viewed the situation, the manaufacturers
and contractors had violated the Act by uniting with one another
to monopolize all the electrical business in New York City. And
even though the union by itself could have struck to enforce a
union boycott of goods without violating the Sherman Act, its
participation in an unlawful combination of businessmen deprived
the union of its antitrust exemption and made it equally liable. 6
Allen Bradley has stood unchallenged for over thirty years.
Thus, a boycott which directly restricts competition in the product
market, and which is brought about by a combination of union
and employers, is a violation of the Sherman Act. Apex Hosiery
does not apply because the restraint is not confined to the labor
market, and Hutcheson does not apply because the union is not
acting alone.
II.

PENNINGTON AND JEWEL TEA

After twenty years of relative quiescence, labor antitrust issues
again claimed the Supreme Court's attention in two major decisions of 1965, UMW v. Pennington27 and Meat Cutters Local 189
v. Jewel Tea Co. 28 In Pennington it was alleged that the United
Mine Workers and the major coal producers had conspired to drive
smaller, less efficient operators out of business by establishing a
uniform industry-wide wage rate higher than the small producers
could afford. If true, the allegation would have made it hard for
the UMW to rely on the Hutcheson exemption for a union acting
Id. at 809-10.
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
28 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See generally Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington
and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. Rav. 317 (1966); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining,
and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 659 (1965).
26
27
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alone. Yet the competition that was to be eliminated was competition "based on differences in labor standards," and thus arguably
the Apex Hosiery doctrine would come into play. Moreover, wages
are at the core of those subjects about which unions and employers
are required to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act.
These so-called "mandatory bargaining subjects," the unions argued, should be equated with Justice Stone's "labor standards."
Surely a matter on which the labor laws compelled bargaining,
they contended, could not be the basis of a prosecution under the
antitrust laws.
Inherent in this argument, of course, was the notion that the
purpose of any wage pact is irrelevant, even if the purpose is to
liquidate the employer's competitors. This proved the fatal flaw.
But the flaw is perhaps more apparent in the abstract than in the
concrete; it is probably easier to say a union and employers may
not have a predatory purpose in a wage agreement than to determine, in any given case, what the purpose might be. And the
history of judicial assessment of union purpose is hardly reassuring.
At any rate, Justice White, in delivering the opinion of the
Court in Pennington, was plainly troubled by the union argument,
though he did not buy it. He conceded that the bounds of the duty
to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act have "great
relevance" in considering the scope of labor's antitrust immunity.2 9
He then proceeded, however, to turn the union argument into a
boomerang by introducing the new concept that the statutory duty
to bargain exists only on a unit-by-unit basis. Unions and employers must negotiate about the wages and employment standards
of workers in a particular bargaining unit, but apparently not
about the standards outside that unit. Thus, a union "forfeits" its
antitrust "exemption" when it is "clearly shown" that it has agreed
with one group of employers "to impose a certain wage scale on
other bargaining units." 30 Moreover, a union is "liable" if it becomes a party to an employer conspiracy to eliminate competitors,
even though the union's role is limited to securing certain wages,
hours, or working conditions from the other employers. 3 '
This approach raises a fistful of new questions. Justice White
suggested a distinction between the union's loss of antitrust im29 381 U.S. at 665.
30 Id.

31 Id. at 665-66.
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munity and its commission of a substantive violation. Does this
mean an agreement with extra-unit implications merely removes
the exemption, without necessarily resulting in a per se violation?
If so, what added elements must be shown to establish an offense?
The Supreme Court long ago declared that only "unreasonable"
restraints of trade run afoul of the Sherman Act. 3 It may well be
that resort to the rule of reason will enable the courts to exercise
considerable flexibility in dealing with extra-unit agreements. A
substantive violation might require a predatory intent, a definite
purpose to impede or destroy business competitors. The trial
court on the remand in Pennington in effect so held.3 4 1 would contend this result is supported by the practical demands of meaningful collective bargaining; it is simply unrealistic to insist that an
employer has no valid interest in the union wage scale to be paid
by the employer's competitors.
The practical implications of Pennington's unit-by-unit bargaining rule are illustrated by the so-called "most favored nation"

clause. This is a fairly common provision in labor contracts, especially in the construction industry, requiring the union to give
the signatory employer the benefit of the most favorable terms the
union subsequently accords any other employer. In actual operation, naturally, the usual effect is to freeze labor standards at the

level of the initial contract. In the language of Pennington, the
union has agreed, at least implicitly, "to impose a certain wage
scale on other bargaining units." This undoubtedly is a form of
restraint, but is it not just another way of advancing the accepted
labor policy of taking wages out of competition? In any event, the
National Labor Relations Board has declared a "most favored

nation clause" to be a mandatory subject of bargaining, which an
employer may insist upon in the absence of a "predatory purSee also Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 688-89 (1965).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); cf. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231 (1918) (trading rules for commodity exchanges).
34 Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968). Other similarly situated
coal operators prevailed, however, against the UMW in their treble damage antitrust
suits. South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971) (damages of $7,231,356 plus $335,000 in attorneys' fees recovered); Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. UMW, 416 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 964 (1970) (damages of $1,432,500 plus $150,000 attorneys' fees recovered).
32

33
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pose." 35 The NLRB distinguished Pennington on the ground that
the clause sought by the employer in the case before the Board
did not obligate the union to impose the same standards on the
employer's competitors.3 6 I find this an unrealistic assessment of
the practicalities of the situation, even though I approve the result.
Ultimately, I should hope that the presence of a predatory purpose
would be recognized as the critical factor, rather than the phrase37
ology of the clause itself.
What, after all, is more natural than for an employer to want
assurance that its competitors will have to match any concessions
it gives the union? As long as we endorse the policy of eliminating
competition based on wage cutting, I see no reason to boggle at a
means so well adapted to attaining that end. Indeed, I find it
difficult to imagine how collective bargaining could stay healthy
if discussion were choked off on some of the most vital subjects,
such as the competitive position of various firms in an industry and
the demands the union will make in other negotiations. And I see
no essential difference between permitting discussion and permitting agreement, so long as there is no specific purpose of destroying
competition. I find unpersuasive Justice White's argument that a
union cannot be allowed to "straitjacket" itself in subsequent
bargaining by commitments to favored employers in earlier negotiations. Those commitments may be the price the union has to
pay to get the concessions in the first place. The employees in the
original unit will hardly complain, and the employees in the other
units are more likely to gain than to lose when a floor is placed
under their wages. In the long run, upholding "most favored nation" provisions would probably do no more than hasten what
the labor economists tell us is a frequent result of union organizaDolly Madison Indus., Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970).
36 Id. at 1038.
37 The NLRB explained the differences in phraseology:
In Pennington, the contractual clause provided that the union would impose upon
all other coal operators in the area the terms of the agreement without regard to
their ability to pay, but the contractual provision herein imposes no such mandate.
. . .In contrast to Pennington, the MFNC provision . . . was manifestly not an
effort to impose wages and working conditions on other employers or employees in
other bargaining units but was designed only to assure that this Emloyer could be
relieved of any disadvantage that it might otherwise suffer if the Union subsequently
negotiated more favorable wage and benefit levels with other employers.
Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038 (1970).
35
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tion anyway, namely the gradual leveling of wage rates throughout
3 8
an area or an industry.
The plight of the employer charged with an unfair labor practice because of Pennington underscores another important aspect
of this decision: its impact falls not so much upon organized labor
as upon the institution of collective bargaining. Indeed, Justice
White stressed that a union acting unilaterally, in furtherance of
its own policies, still has the right to seek uniform wages in an
industry.3 9 Only when this is done pursuant to a union-employer
agreement do antitrust issues arise. But Pennington applied literally may seriously hamstring collective bargaining as an instrument
for coping with today's critical problems in industrial relations.
For example, management's need to introduce technological improvements to increase productivity and meet competition is
countered by labor's anxiety over the possible loss of job security
and craft skills. Reconciliation of these opposing interests through
means such as attritional reductions in force or retraining allowances may be severely hampered if employers cannot be reassured
of the demands that will be made of their competitors.
The "most favored nation" clause can stand as a symbol of a
whole range of activities which may be classified broadly as pattern bargaining-efforts by either unions or employers to obtain
uniform labor contracts governing sperate bargaining units. Two
typical issues left in the wake of Pennington are whether it is an
antitrust violation or an unfair labor practice (1) for two or more
unions to coordinate bargaining policy with respect to different
units of the same business or, (2) for employers, in the absence of
a formal multiemployer unit, to adopt common bargaining strategy
or tactics, such as joint lockouts in the event one employer is struck.
Another question raised by Pennington has been laid to rest.
The Court explicitly refrained from passing on the sufficiency of
the evidence. Yet in declaring that the extra-unit agreement had
to be "clearly shown," Justice White seemed to be suggesting the
40
possibility of a special evidentiary standard. In Ramsey v. UMW,
however, a five-to-four majority of the Court held that the ordinary
preponderance of evidence standard is applicable to substantive
violations in civil antitrust actions against labor unions. Only in
38 E.g., L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 647-57 (5th ed. 1970).
39 381 U.S. at 665 n.2.

40 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
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proving the authority of individual members, officers, and agents
of a union to act on its behalf must the clear proof test of Section
6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act be met.4 1 Perhaps it would be more
straightforward to say that a proper reconciliation of antitrust and
labor policies calls for an interpretation of the Sherman Act, without reference to Norris-La Guardia, requiring evidence of an explicit union-employer agreement to force competitors out of business before a case could go to a jury. Mere knowledge that some
marginal operators could not pay the prescribed industry wage
scale would not, in itself, be sufficient. 42 Otherwise, local juries in
passing on whether a particular wage scale is too high could easily
undercut the national policy of promoting free collective bargaining.
In Pennington the key question was whether a labor agreement
dealing with wages would violate the antitrust laws if its purpose
was to put certain competitors out of business. The answer was
"yes." In Jewel Tea the question was quite different: was it a violation of the Sherman Act for a butchers' union to compel a grocery
chain to agree to limit the hours fresh meat could be sold (9:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m.), after the union had entered into a multiemployer contract containing such a restriction? As viewed by a
majority of the Court, the problem was one of characterization: did
this clause involve wages, hours, or working conditions, legitimate
subjects of collective bargaining, or did it constitute a forbidden
restraint on the product market?
The Court split three ways, with three Justices in each group.
Justice White, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Brennan found
that the marketing hours restriction, which in effect defined the
butchers' working hours and their job content, was "intimately
related" to labor conditions. Thus the union's effort to secure the
provision through arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of its own
labor policies, and not in furtherance of a union-employer conspiracy, was exempt under the Sherman Act.43 Justices Goldberg,
41 Id. at 311.

Justices Douglas, Black, and Clark, concurring in Pennington, would apparently regard the wage agreement under such circumstances as prima facie evidence of a violation.
381 U.S. at 673. The three concurring Justices made no mention of unit-by-unit bargaining, and simply declared that a union-employer agreement to set a high wage scale for the
purpose of forcing marginal producers out of business would be in violation of the antitrust laws. Id.
43 381 U.S. at 689-90.
42
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Harlan, and Stewart concurred for the same reasons that led them
to dissent in Pennington. They accepted the union argument that
agreements dealing with mandatory subjects of bargaining are
wholly outside the antitrust laws.4 4 Justices Douglas, Black, and
Clark dissented in Jewel Tea on the ground the operating hours
limitation was an obvious restraint on the product market, and
was not needed to fix employees' working hours. The multiemployer collective agreement itself was considered sufficient to
show an illegal union-employer conspiracy to impose the market4 5
ing hours restriction on the holdout chain.
No single opinion in Jewel Tea represents the views of a majority of the Court. Rather than focus on the decision itself, therefore, I should like to examine two long-standing legal issues on
which Jewel Tea revived debate.
First, if a union is protected by Hutcheson's exemption for a
union acting alone when it strikes an employer over a particular
bargaining demand, does it follow that a collective agreement
granting that demand, even an agreement by a group of employers,
is likewise immune to antitrust scrutiny? It has been argued that
it would be an intolerable paradox to sanction economic warfare
while outlawing the peace treaty.4 6 This anomaly will probably
not be decisive; the Supreme Court accepts, for example, the
anomaly that state right-to-work laws may be invoked against
union security agreements but not against strikes to obtain them.4
As will be discussed later,48 Connell points in the same direction
in the antitrust area. On the other hand, certain language in Allen
Bradley could be read to mean that a union commits a violation
only when it participates in a preexisting employer conspiracy. 49
Although Justice White would not have immunized the agreement
in Jewel Tea merely because it was between a union and a single
employer, he emphasized that the union was acting in pursuit of
its own labor policies and not at the behest of any employers.5
This adds some weight to the notion that the source of the impulse
44
45
46

Id. at 711-13, 731-35.
Id. at 735-36.
Cox, supra note 24, at 271. See generally

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY

TION.AL COM:ITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS

297-99 (1955).

47 Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 105 (1963).
See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
49 Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797, 809 (1945).
50 381 U.S. at 688-90.
48
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for a particular provision may be crucial. A clause which would be
barred by the antitrust laws if sought by employers may remain
within the union exemption if sought by a labor organization. My
difficulty with this is that I am skeptical about maintaining a neat
dichotomy between union-motivated and employer-motivated contract provisions. One side raises a problem in negotiations, the
other proposes a solution, the first party modifies the suggestion.
To whom do we ascribe the final product? I doubt whether the
"source" test can be conclusive, although evidence of the source of
a clause may occasionally aid in determining its relation to working
conditions.
The second problem spotlighted by Jewel Tea is the standard
which should be used to distinguish between agreements properly
concerned with wages, hours, and other components of the labor
market, and agreements improperly concerned with the product
market. Unlike the wage contract in Pennington, which in and of
itself involved only a restraint on the labor market, the contract in
Jewel Tea involved both a restraint on the labor market (defining
the butchers' working hours and job content) and a restraint on the
product market (restricting the hours for selling fresh meat). Justice White assumed that if the agreement had dealt directly only
wih the product market (for example, fixing a price schedule for
the meat), with any benefit to the employees merely an indirect
consequence, it would not have been immune to the antitrust
laws ."' What saved the Jewel Tea provision in his eyes was that the
marketing-hours restriction was "intimately related" to wages,
hours, and working conditions. The trial court had found as a fact
that self-service meat sales were unfeasible, and therefore a limitation on operating hours was necessary to preserve the butchers' jobs
and working hours.52
In sustaining the agreement's exemption from the antitrust laws
in this situation, Justice White at one point seemed to be "weighing" the employees' interests in labor standards against the admittedly adverse effects on product competition.53 Apparently for
Justice White, any showing of an "immediate and legitimate"
employee concern would be enough to tip the scales to the side of
the union. My reaction to this approach is rather mixed. Any
51 Id. at 689.
52 Id. at 694.
53 Id. at 691.
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reintroduction of the pre-Norris-La Guardia judicial technique of
balancing the social plusses and minuses of union objectives must
be viewed with some apprehension. But if such balancing is to be
indulged in, it should not be just an armchair exercise. Twenty
years ago Archibald Cox observed that there was "no reliable information on the extent or economic importance of union efforts
to shelter employers from competition in the product market." 54
As best I can tell, things stand today as they stood then.5 5 If Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell presage a resurgence of labor
antitrust litigation (so far there has been surprisingly little), it
would indeed be unfortunate for the Court to have to resolve
some of the legal issues posed without more enlightment on the
economic realities. This is especially true in view of the improved
tools for empirical research that have been developed in recent
decades.
III.

CONNELL CONSTRUCTION

A.

The Decision

The Supreme Court's latest effort to harmonize labor and antitrust policies was Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local
100." Plumbers Local 100, which represents workers in the plumbing and mechanical trades in Dallas, requested Connell, a general
contractor, to agree to subcontract mechanical work only to firms
that had a collective bargaining agreement with the union. Since
Connell subcontracts all plumbing and mechnical work, Local
100 expressly disclaimed any interest in representing Connell employees. When Connell refused to agree, Local 100 placed a single
Cox, supra note 24, at 272.
There is at least some reputable economic thinking that such restrictive union practices as limiting output, fixing prices, and dividing markets have a significant adverse effect
on the economy. See, e.g., A. REES, THE ECONOMICS or TRADE UNIONS 140-42 (1962). But
cf. W. HABER & H. LEVISON, LABOR RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BUILDING TRADES
191-93, 250 (1956). On the other hand, several post-World War II studies lead me to
conclude that industry-wide bargaining and multiemployer bargaining are economically
more beneficial than harmful. R. LESTER & E. ROBIE, WAGES UNDER NATIONAL AND REGIONAL
54

55

EXPERIENCE IN SEVEN INDUSTRIES (1946); Dunlop, Economic Aspects
of Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining:Allocation of the Labor Force, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRY-WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 34 (1949); Kerr & Fisher,
Multiple-Employer Bargaining: The San Francisco Experience, in INSIGHTS INTO LABOR
ISSUES 25 (R. Lester & J. Shister eds. 1948).
56 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
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picket at one of Connell's major jobsites, thereby halting construction. Connell filed suit in state court to enjoin the picketing as a
violation of Texas antitrust law. After Local 100 removed the case
to federal court, Connell signed the subcontracting agreement
under protest. It then amended its complaint to allege that the
agreement violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, forbidding contracts in restraint of trade, and Section 2 of the Act, forbidding
monopolies. 57
The federal district court held that the subcontracting agreement was exempt from the federal antitrust laws because it was
authorized by the construction industry proviso to Section 8 (e) of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).5 The court also held
that federal labor legislation preempted the state's antitrust
laws. 59 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without
reaching the Section 8 (e) issue, on the ground that the local's goal
of organizing nonunion subcontractors was a legitimate union interest, and therefore its efforts toward that goal were exempt from
the federal antitrust laws. 60 The court of appeals agreed that state
law was preempted.0 1 In a five-to-four majority opinion by Justice
Powell, the Supreme Court reversed on the question of federal
antitrust immunity and affirmed on the question of state law preemption. The Court remanded for consideration of the claim that
the agreement violated the Sherman Act. 2
Justice Powell acknowledged that a labor organization may
avail itself of either of two types of exemptions from the operation
of the antitrust laws. First, there is the statutory exemption provided by the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia Acts, as interpreted in
Hutcheson, covering unilateral union activity like secondary picketing and boycotts. 63 Second, there is a nonstatutory exemption,
applied in Jewel Tea, which "has its source in the strong labor
policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competi57
58

15 US.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).
78 L.R.R.M. 3012, 3014 (N.D. Tex. 1971). Section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (e) (1970),

forbids an employer to agree with a union not to do business with any other person. A
proviso applicable to the construction industry permits agreements relating to work "to
be done" at a jobsite. See note 71 infra.
59 78 L.R.R.M. at 3014.
60 483 F.2d 1154, 1169-71 (5th Cir. 1973).
61 Id. at 1175.
62 421 U.S. at 637.
63 Id. at 621-22.
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tion over wages and working conditions." 61 Justice Powell pointed
out, however, that the statutory exemption does not apply to concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor parties.
Moreover, "while the statutory exemption allows unions to accomplish some restraints by acting unilaterally, . . . the nonstatutory exemption offers no similar protection when a union and a
nonlabor party agree to restrain competition in a business
market." 65
In the eyes of the Court, Local 100 had used direct restraints on
the commercial market to achieve its concededly lawful organizational objective. The restrictive agreements with Connell and
other general contractors were designed to force nonunion subcontractors out of the market, "even if their competitive advantages were not derived from substandard wages and working conditions but rather from more efficient operating methods." 66 Although the multiemployer contract between Local 100 and the
Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas had not been challenged in the suit,6 7 Justice Powell was prepared to examine it to
determine the effect of the agreement between Local 100 and Connell on the business market. The multiemployer contract contained a "most favored nation" clause. To the Court this meant that
subcontractors in the Association would be sheltered from competition in that portion of the market covered by Local 100's subcontracting agreements with general contractors, with respect to
all subjects included in the multiemployer contract, even subjects
unrelated to wages or working conditions.6 8 Next, the Court speculated that the subcontracting agreements with general contractors
could give Local 100 control over access to the mechanical subcontracting market, since the union might refuse to sign contracts with
64 Id. at 622. Curiously, Justice Powell did not cite Apex Hosiery, where the nonstatutory exemption apparently originated and where it received its fullest explication. See
notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps Justice Powell wished to limit the
nonstatutory exemption to situations involving union activity, rather than embrace
Justice Stone's more expansive concept that the Sherman Act simply does not reach a
certain class of labor market restraints, whether imposed by unions or management.
65 421 U.S. at 622-23.
66

Id. at 623.

Id. There was no evidence that Local 100's organizing campaign resulted from any
agreement with employers, and Connell had not argued the case on a theory of conspiracy between the union and the unionized subcontractors. Id. at 625 n.2.
68 Id. at 623-24. There was no indication that the multiemployer contract contained
provisions dealing with anything but mandatory subjects of bargaining.
67
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marginal or nonresident firms.0 9 Finally, since Local 100 had no
interest in representing Connell's employees, it could not rely on
the federal policy favoring collective bargaining to save its campaign to exclude nonunion subcontractors from the market.7"
The Court then rejected the union's contention that the Connell
agreement was explicitly authorized by the construction industry
proviso to Section 8 (e) of the NLRA. 1' Justice Powell granted that
the literal language of the statute lent support to the union's position, 2 but declared that the proviso was intended to deal with only
a limited range of "special problems" in the construction industry.73 These included the difficulties of organizing a nonunion
subcontractor on a picketed multiemployer building project, and
the friction that arises when union men have to work alongside
nonunion men at a jobsite. The Court concluded that the Section
8 (e) proviso "extends only to [subcontracting] agreements in the
context of collective bargaining relationships, and . . . possibly to
common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as well." 74 Since
Local 100's subcontracting agreement met neither condition, the
Section 8 (e) proviso conferred no antitrust immunity.
09 Id. at 624-25. As long as it acts in its own interest, a union may decline to contract

with anyone for any reason. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 824-25 (1945). Nothing in
the record, however, suggests that Local 100 meant to scorn any contractors willing to
sign union agreements.
70 421 U.S. at 625-26.
71 Section 8 (e) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered
into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforcible and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of
the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other
work . ..
29 US.C. § 158(e) (1970).
72 421 U.S. at 626-28.
73 Id. at 629-31.
74 Id. at 633. Logically, under the majority's rationale, either the existence of a collective
bargaining relationship or the limitation of the agreement to particular jobsites (where
union men are working?) would appear to be a separate, independent basis for Section
8 (e) proviso coverage and concomitant antitrust immunity. The Connell opinion is not
clear on these points.
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Lastly, the Court disposed of the union argument that even if
the subcontracting agreement violated Section 8 (e), the remedies
under the NLRA would be exclusive. Justice Powell recognized
that in 1947 Congress rejected attempts to regulate union secondary activities by repealing the statutory antitrust exemptions, 75
and instead made them unfair labor practices under Section 8 (b)
(4),"6 subject to injunctions under Section 10 (1)17 and to actual
damages under Section 303. 78 But he emphasized there was no comparable legislative history in the 1959 Congress, which enacted
Section 8 (e) to outlaw so-called "hot-cargo" clauses. The majority
of the Court was thus satisfied that the NLRA remedies for Section
8 (e) violations did not preclude antitrust remedies in cases like
Connell.79 Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and Marshall, dissented, primarily on the issue of the exclusivity of
NLRA remedies.8 0
B.

Critique

In terms of previous antitrust rulings, the central issue in Connell would seem to be whether Local 100's subcontracting agreement dealt with wages, hours, and working conditions, or whether
it constituted only a direct restraint on the product market. Since
the parties had obviously executed an agreement, Justice Powell
was apparently correct that Hutcheson's statutory exemption for
a union acting alone did not apply.8 And since there was no showing of a union-employer conspiracy with the predatory purpose of
driving out competition, 2 there was only a minor role for the
Pennington principle that even contracts covering wages and
working conditions are subject to the antitrust laws if their pur75

421 U.S. at 634.
76 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970).
77 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 160 () (1970).
78 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
79 421 U.S. at 634-35.
80 421 U.S. at 638-39. The dissenting Justices were also less certain than the majority
about whether Local 100's subcontracting agreement was invalid under Section 8 (e) 's
proviso. Id. at 648 n.8.
81 See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text. This assumes, of course, that a unionemployer agreement is not necessarily insulated from antitrust sanctions merely because
the union's unilateral action to secure it was so insulated. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text.
82 See note 67 supra.
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pose is to eliminate competition." Thus the key precedents in the
effort to distinguish between lawful labor market restraints and
unlawful product market restraints are such decisions as Jewel Tea
and Allen Bradley.
Jewel Tea established that agreements "intimately related" to
working conditions are exempt from antitrust regulation, even
though they may also directly affect the product market.8 4 It is
difficult to see how any union objective, on its face, could be more
a matter of working conditions than organizing employees and securing recognition as their bargaining representative. Indeed, the
standard union recognition clause is a mandatory subject of bargaining5 On the other hand, Allen Bradley makes clear that the

basic union goal of raising workers' wages does not justify a unionemployer combination to exclude the products of all employers,
union and nonunion, located outside a union's geographical jurisdiction. 6 Is this because secondary agreements to exclude firms
from the market can never escape antitrust scrutiny? Evidently
not. On the same day Allen Bradley was decided, the Supreme
Court declared in Hunt v. Crumboch 87 that a union's contracts
with various employers to use only trucking firms organized by the
union were not subject to antitrust strictures. Several factors may
distinguish Allen Bradley from Hunt. First, although the record
suggests that the union in Allen Bradley actually masterminded
the combination, the Court treated the situation as if the union
had merely joined an employer conspiracy already in existence. 8
Second, by the very terms of the agreement in Allen Bradley, the
electrical manufacturers of New York City were to be sheltered
against competition in the product market from out-of-city manufacturers, regardless of how eager the latter might be to sign a
union contract. Finally, the restraint in Allen Bradley went beyond
the bounds of any immediate, legitimate union demands, organizational or otherwise. Any wage gains that accrued to the union's
members could have been only the by-product of a scheme to provide monopoly profits for the local manufacturers. 9
83 See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text.

84
85
86
87
88
89

381 U.S. at 689-91.
Cf. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
325 U.S. at 799-801.
325 U.S. 821, 823 (1945).
325 U.S. at 799, 809; see note 49 supra and accompanying text.
See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 234, 241-42
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The Connell majority erred in failing to realize that under established precedents, the antitrust laws exempt agreements,
whether primary or secondary, that are aimed at promoting union
organization, as well as agreements that are aimed at eliminating
competition over labor standards. The principal qualification, as
Allen Bradley suggests, is that the restriction must not be broader
than the objective requiresY0 Perhaps Justice Powell had something like this in mind when he commented in Connell that the
challenged agreements "did not simply prohibit subcontracting to
any nonunion firm; they prohibited subcontracting to any firm
that did not have a contract with Local 100." 9' But in the parlance
of the building trades, a "nonunion" firm in the jurisdiction of
Local 100 would have meant any employer not having a contract
with Local 100. Certainly there is nothing in the record to indicate
that Local 100 was seeking to use the subcontracting clause to
establish the sort of "geographical enclave" involved in Allen
Bradley. Thus, without ever undertaking the critical inquiry into
the extent to which the subcontracting agreement was related to
union organizational objectives, the Connell majority arrived at
92
the conclusion that the union had lost its antitrust immunity.
While Connell seems plainly at odds with the more enlightened
labor antitrust trends of recent years, the Sherman Act's Delphic
phraseology compels its decipherers to fall back on their own philosophies of competition. In an earlier day, the Court's decision
Winter, supra note 24, at 21. The former is a sharp, constructive analysis of recent labor
antitrust developments, somewhat marred, in my view, by a failure to pay sufficient heed
to the implications of the two separate bases for antitrust immunity, the statutory exemption proclaimed in Hutcheson and the nonstatutory exemption enunciated in Apex
Hosiery and Jewel Tea.
90 The notion that a union's direct, contractual restraint of the product market can be
justified only to the extent that it is necessary to further a union's lawful objectives in
the labor market casts doubt on Justice White's handling of the facts in Jewel Tea, if not
his rationale. If any weight at all is to be given to the consumers' interest in having meat
available for sale after 6:00 P.M., it would seem that the employees' interest could have
been adequately protected by the clause expressly defining their working hours and job
content. See 381 U.S. at 738 (Douglas, J., dissenting) . Jewel Tea stands as a tribute to the
power of Mr. Dunau's advocacy in persuading the Supreme Court to accept as binding
the trial court's factual finding that the marketing-hours limitation was necessary to police
the guarantee of specified working hours and job content.
91 421 U.S. at 624.
92 The Court has stressed that it is up to Congress to deal with secondary arrangements
for organizational purposes. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797,
803-10 (1945); Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
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would have been regarded as wholly in keeping with the congressional design. Far more disturbing, as a matter of statutory interpretation, is the majority's handling of the construction industry
proviso to Section 8 (e) of the NLRA. The general prohibitory
language of Section 8 (e) was written in 1959 to plug a loophole in
the original secondary boycott ban in Section 8 (b) (4). According
to the Supreme Court, Section 8 (b) (4) forbade union concerted
action to force one employer to cease doing business with another,
but did not forbid a union-employer agreement to secure the same
result.9 3 Section 8 (e) was the legislative response to this anomaly.
At the same time, however, it was recognized that the interlocking
relationships of contractors and subcontractors in the construction
and garment industries called for special treatment. Two different
provisos were therefore inserted to deal with these industries.
Senator Kennedy, the floor manager of the bill in the Senate,
explained the building industry proviso as follows:
Agreements by which a contractor in the construction industry promises not to subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion
contractor appear to be legal today. They will not be unlawful
under section 8 (e) .94
The House Conference Report was similarly sweeping:
The committee of conference does not intend that this proviso
should be construed so as to change the present state of the law with
respect to the validity of this specific type of agreement .... To the
extent that such agreements are legal today under section 8 (b) (4)
.... the proviso would prevent such legality from being affected by
section 8 (e) .95
Nothing in the legislative history section directly supports the
position of the Connell Court that the Section 8 (e) proviso was
limited to collective bargaining contexts, or to particular jobsites.
The majority opinion did not quote the unqualified statements of
Senator Kennedy and the House conferees which clearly cut the
other way, but instead buried ambiguous references to them in the
Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
17900-01 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DiscLosuR Acr OF 1959, at 1433 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as LEGis. HIST.].
95 H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1959), reprinted in I LEGIS. HIST. 943.
93

94 105 CONG. REC.
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middle of a long footnote.9 6 The Court's insistence on restricting
subcontracting agreements to particular jobsites, and its rejection
of the notion that the jobsite requirement merely excludes agreements covering subcontractors "who deliver their work complete"
to the site, 97 also fly in the face of legislative declarations on this
specific point.98 In terms of policy, the most significant aspect of
the Court's approach to the Section 8 (e) proviso may have been its
pronouncement that to permit subcontracting agreements with
"stranger" contractors, without limitation to particular jobsites,
"would give construction unions an almost unlimited organizational weapon." 99 Rendering judgments of this nature, about the
appropriate economic weapons to be allowed the parties in an
organizational campaign or other industrial combat, has long been
thought to be the province of the Congress, not the courts.'
The Connell decision also fails to square with two other lines of
authority. First, as contended by Local 100, the Labor Board and
its General Counsel had apparently resolved the Section 8 (e) proviso issue in the union's favor. 01' The majority of the Court attempted to dispose of this argument by asserting that the Board
precedent may have involved no more than an employer challenge
96 421 U.S. at 629 n.8. Justice Powell commented that "the Committee may have intended the § 8(e) proviso simply to preserve the status quo under Carpenters Union v.
NLRB (Sand Door) . . . pending action on the Denver Building Trades [common-situs
picketing] problem in the following session." Does this suggest the novel concept of a
statutory provision that lapses of its own accord, when subsequent legislative plans go
awry?
97 421 U.S. at 632.
98 The proviso relates only to the "contracting or subcontracting of work to be done
at the site of the construction." 105 CONG. REC. 17900 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGrs. HIST.
1433 (remarks of Senator Kennedy). See also H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39
(1959), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HisT. 943. The only significant debate over the jobsite
limitation arose when two union sympathizers, in a bid at some post-legislative history,
maintained that the proviso covered not only work to be done at the site, but also work
which could be done there. Compare id. at A8141, 2 LEhIs. HiST. at 1815 (remarks of
Senator McNamara) and id. at A8222, 2 LEaCs. Hisr. at 1816 (remarks of Representative
Thompson) with id. at A8611, 2 LEais. HIsT. at 1861 (remarks of Representative Kearns).
99 421 U.S. at 631.
100 See note 92 supra; cf. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644
(1967); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-18 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-98 (1960).
101 421 U.S. at 631-32 n.10; see Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (B & J
Investment Co.), 214 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 87 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1974); Los Angeles Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council (Church's Fried Chicken, Inc.), 183 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1-970); NLRB
General Counsel Memorandum, Release No. R-1343 (July 2, 1974).
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to a "prehire" agreement, which Section 8 (f) of the NLRA 102
would have authorized even before the general contractor had any
employees on the job. In addition, the Court concluded that the
General Counsel was concerned only with the question whether a
preexisting collective bargaining relationship was necessary for a
permissible subcontracting clause. At least the General Counsel,
however, seems to have had a Connell-type situation specifically in
mind:
A number of cases have raised the issue of whether a construction
union violates sections 8 (b) (4) (A) and/or 8 (e) when it seeks or
obtains by picketing an otherwise valid on-site construction subcontracting clause under the 8 (e) proviso from a contractor who does
not himself employ employees of the craft represented by that union.
[I]t has been contended ...that the union's conduct to obtain the
agreement accordingly violated the Act, because the contractor did
not employ employees of the craft represented by the union and had
no collective-bargaining relationship with the union.103
As the agency primarily charged with the interpretation and enforcement of the NLRA, the Labor Board was entitled to more
deference than it was shown.
Second, Connell ignored an important parallel development in
the law. In Dallas Building & Construction Trades Counsel v.
NLRB, 0 4 the District of Columbia Circuit held that union action
like that in Connell could violate the organizational picketing restrictions of Section 8 (b) (7) of the NLRA,10 5 unless the "coverage
of the proposed contract is limited to the type of work which is
never performed by the general contractors' own employees." 106
The court of appeals in Dallas was plainly informing the union
that, if it wished to escape the strictures of Section 8 (b) (7), it
should seek the very sort of agreement that Connell would later say
102

29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7)

(1970).

103 NLRB General Counsel Memorandum, supra note 101, at 1.

104 396 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
105 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7)
(1970). With qualifications not here relevant, Section
8(b) (7) forbids organizational or recognition picketing by an uncertified union in
several different situations. Probably the most important limitation, as a practical matter,
is that the picketing must not be carried on for more than a reasonable length of time
(not to exceed thirty days) without a representation petition being filed under Section
9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c) (1970).
106 396 F.2d at 682 n.8.

HeinOnline -- 62 Va. L. Rev. 625 1976

626

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 62:603

violated Section 8 (e) and perhaps the antitrust laws as well. The
Court in Connell never addressed this dilemma. To the further
contention in the Connell opinion that the union's proposed reading of Section 8 (e) would undermine Section 8 (b) (7)'s policy
against "top-down" organizing campaigns, 107 Judge McGowan in
Dallas had the short answer: "Sections 8 (b) (7) and 8 (e) are aimed
at wholly different problems." 108
The most egregious failure of the Connell majority to take
proper account of the policies of the labor laws in working out
an accommodation with the antitrust laws came last, and Justice
Stewart made it the principal focus of his dissent. As he pointed
out, Local 100's secondary activity at the Connell site was subject
to comprehensive regulation under Sections 8 (b) (4) and 8 (e) of
the NLRA and Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA). Congress, in his view, meant to impose carefully
defined sanctions for union secondary violations, and in so doing,
meant to exclude private antitrust suits as a remedy.
Justice Stewart first demonstrated that in passing the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress deliberately rejected a provision initially
adopted by the House and advocated by Senator Ball and others,
which would have authorized the antitrust remedies of treble
damages and private actions for injunctions against secondary
boycotts.'0 9 Senator Taft could not have been more explicit:
"Under the Sherman Act the same question of boycott damage is
subject to a suit for [treble] damages and attorneys' fees. In this
case we simply provide for the amount of the actual damages." 110
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Connell, had no quarrel
with this view of the 1947 legislative history.' Justice Stewart and
Justice Powell parted company over the interpretation of the 1959
amendments." 2 While Justice Powell is correct that Taft-Hartley's
107 421 U.S. at 632-33.

108 396 F.2d at 682.
109 421 US. at 641-45; see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 44, 45-46 (1947);
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 22, 54-55 (1947); 93 CONG. REC. 4838 (1947)
(remarks of Senator Ball) ; id. at 4847.
110 93 CONG. REc. 4872-73 (1947). Senator Taft's view prevailed. See id. at 4874-75. The
compromise was to direct the NLRB to seek injunctions against secondary boycotts under
Section 10 (0 of the NLRA, and to permit private parties to sue for actual damages
under Section 303 of the LMRA. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-59, 67 (1947).
See also Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 n.16 (1964).
111 See notes 75-78 supra and accompanying text.
112 421 U.S. at 646-53 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Section 303, providing for actual damages for violations of Section
8 (b) (4), was not amended in 1959 to cover Section 8 (e) violations
as such, Justice Stewart is on much firmer ground in maintaining
that the legislative history in general, and the treatment of Sections
8 (e) and 303 in particular, denote a congressional intent to eschew
antitrust sanctions. During the House deliberations, Representatives Hiestand, Alger, and Hoffman made repeated efforts to impose antitrust restrictions on union activity, but all of these were
defeated. 113 Even more to the point are the words of Representative
Griffin, in opposing Representative Alger's proposed amendment
and urging adoption of his own bill instead:
There is no antitrust law provision in this bill.
I believe I speak for the gentleman from Georgia

[MR. LAN-

DRUM], as well as myself when I say that if amendments are offered

on the floor to add antitrust provisions or others that have been
1 4
mentioned, I, for one, will oppose them. "
Technically, of course, there would have been no need for
Congress to add antitrust provisions in 1959, if the Sherman Act
had already applied, and if the only question were whether Congress was going to create a new exemption through the labor laws.
It is exactly here, however, that the Connell majority failed to
achieve a balanced appraisal by concentrating too much on the
antitrust laws, and overlooking the obvious implications of the
labor laws. As Justices Powell and Stewart observed, the 1959 congressional endeavor was to close certain "technical loopholes" in
Taft-Hartley's original secondary boycott ban."I5 To this end,
Section 8 (e) was added to outlaw "hot-cargo" agreements, with the
exceptions previously discussed, and Section 303 was amended to
provide actual damages for secondary union activity to force an
employer to execute an agreement in violation of Section 8 (e). But
Section 303 was not amended to cover such an agreement. in and of
itself. Since the antitrust laws exempt the conduct of a union acting alone, even though the agreement sought may be subject to
113 See, e.g., 105 CoNG. REC. 12135 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGIs. HiST. 1507 (remarks of
Representative Heistand) ; id. at 12136-37, 15532-35, 15858, 2 LEMls. Hisr. at 1507-08, 1569,
1690 (remarks of Representative Alger) ; id. at 15853, 15874, 2 LEGis. HIST. at 1685, 1692
(remarks of Representative Hoffman).
114 Id. at 15535, 2 LrErs. HIST. at 1572.
115 421 US. at 628, 646.
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antitrust regulation," 6 it would not necessarily be inconsistent
with antitrust theory to impose treble damages for a forbidden
Section 8 (e) contract, while leaving a party victimized by the pressure tactics employed in pursuit of such a contract to the remedy of
actual damages under Section 303. In the hierarchy of labor law
values, however, coercive action is almost invariably subject to
more severe sanctions than is an agreement."- This treatment is
specifically evident with regard to Section 8 (e). The LandrumGriffin substitute provided that Section 303 should apply to conduct violative of Sections 8 (b) (4) and 8 (b) (7), but not to agreements violative of Section 8 (e). s This was no oversight; prohibited Section 8 (e) agreements were made subject to Section 10 (l)'s
mandatory injunction procedures? 1 9 As a matter of labor policy,
therefore, it would be incongruous for Congress to prescribe actual
damages under Section 303 for secondary activity in violation of
Section 8 (b) (4), but not for agreements in violation of Section
8 (e)-all for the purpose of subjecting the latter alone to the much
harsher remedy of treble damages under the antitrust laws. Far
more reasonable is the conclusion that Congress meant to provide
only the usual cease-and-desist and Section 10 (1) injunctive relief
for contracts forbidden by Section 8 (e), and no damage remedies
at all.
C.

Practical Observations

For all that it may say about the Burger Court's attitude toward
the application of the antitrust laws to labor activity, Connell itself may have only a limited practical effect. Local 100's subcontracting arrangement was a relatively novel organizing tactic in
the building trades, probably prompted by the broad hint furnished in the Dallas case.' 20 There seem to be several different ways
in which a union like Local 100 could pursue its organizational
objectives within the parameters of Section 8 (e)'s proviso as interpreted by Connell. For example, if the requirements of a collective
116 See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958)
(under
pre-1959 law, hot-cargo agreement was permitted but coercive action to enforce it was
prohibited).
118 H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 705 (e) (1959), reprinted in I LEGIS. HiST. 685.
119 Id. at § 705 (d), 1 LEGis. HisT. at 685.
120 See notes 104-05 supra and accompanying text.
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bargaining relationship and the limitation to particular jobsites
are separate, independent grounds for proviso protection,' 2 ' a
local union that does not represent employees of the general contractor might merely have to confine the subcontracting agreement
to a list of specified jobs for which the general contractor has been
engaged. 122 I should also think that the policy apparently underlying Connell would not be offended if the subcontracting bar extended to all future projects undertaken by the general contractor
within the jurisdiction of the local, but this is more problematical
in light of Connell's "particular jobsites" language. If the Court's
emphasis was on the notion that union men (or women) are entitled to protect themselves against having to work alongside nonunion people,'123 a subcontracting clause may be valid if limited to
jobsites at which union men would be working. Where the general
contractor itself is organized, as was Connell, that could include
all sites at which the general's own employees are at work, in addition to those at which the members of a union in the position of

Local 100 are employed.
A collective bargaining relationship, either by itself or in conjunction with the particular jobsite limitation, may be an essential
condition for a lawful subcontracting clause within the Section
8 (e) proviso. If so, it should still not be too difficult for building
trades unions, without departing substantially from customary
bargaining patterns in the construction industry, to comply with
this requirement. Frequently, the crafts employed by a general
contractor will designate the local building trades council, comprising the area's craft unions, as the official bargaining representative for all the general's craft employees. While individual craft
arangements are then usually worked out with the various participating locals, I do not see why they could not join in a single master contract that would include the desired subcontracting agreements covering the several crafts. A multicraft contract would

have the advantage not only of promoting union organizational
objectives within a collective bargaining context, but also of meet121 See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
122 A union picketing for such a clause would presumably have to disclaim any interest
in ousting a nonunion subcontractor already under agreement for a particular job. Otherwise, the union could run afoul of Section 8 (b) (4) (B) 's ban on forcing one employer to
.,cease doing business" with another. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (B) (1970).
123 See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
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ing the subsidiary Connell test of protecting the union employees
of the general contractor from being forced to work with nonunion employees.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The larger questions left by Connell concern its implications
for the future direction of antitrust regulation of labor activity,
without regard to the peculiar structure of the building industry.
These are not easy to discern. Connell may foreshadow a stiffer
standard for determining what constitutes wages and working conditions within the nonstatutory antitrust exemption of Apex Hosiery and Jewel Tea. It is surely not insignificant that Justice White,
who wrote what is as close as anything we have to an opinion of the
Court in Jewel Tea, provided the critical fifth vote in Connell.
I would not be at all appalled at the idea of the Court's looking
closer than it did in Jewel Tea at a union's supposed need for a
restriction that both directly affects the product market and has
some relation, intimate or otherwise, to wages and working conditions.1 4 Yet if Connell is indicative of the Court's capacity for a
balanced assessment in such circumstances, the litmus-like test of
Jewel Tea is much to be preferred.
Inevitably, there will be an overlap between labor and antitrust
regulation. Although we may assume that union activity protected
under the NLRA will never be held violative of the antitrust laws,
it does not follow that labor-management conduct is immune to
antitrust remedies simply because it may also be subject to NLRA
prohibitions and remedies. Allen Bradley involved labor activity
that would obviously have been forbidden under Taft-Hartley's
subsequently enacted Section 8 (b) (4) ban on secondary boycotts;
nonetheless, Allen Bradley remains the paradigm union antitrust
violation. Drawing the line between union activity that is subject
to antitrust sanctions and union activity that is subject, if at all,
only to labor law and remedies will continue to be one of the most
delicate, demanding tasks confronting the judiciary. In my view,
primary reliance should be placed on the labor laws. Unions and
124 See note 90 supra; cf. notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text. Another example of
a collective bargaining restraint that is likely to come under renewed scrutiny following
Connell is the "most favored nation" clause, at least where it is not clearly limited to labor
standards. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
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the antitrust laws are premised on fundamentally opposing philosophies of competition. There will be anomalies at best, and grave
distortions at worst, in attempting to regulate labor organizations
through an instrument so at odds with their nature and purposes.
We have long since concluded that the value of unions in our
society makes them worth promoting. Having made that judgment,
we must be prepared to abide some of the consequences.
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